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Abstract 
This paper provides a viable systems perspective of an outcome-based service initiative involving major manufacturers in 
the defence industry. The viable systems perspective allowed a coherent structuration of the complex servitization context 
involving provider and customer organizations. It also unveiled critical relationship mechanisms that enable synergy and 
facilitate the achievement of co-capability by the organizations involved. Through a case study approach, the research finds 
that interventions in the customer system reduce variability in the provider system as well as in the service system as a 
whole. The systemic interventions are implemented via key provider/customer relationships the study identifies. The 
relationships deal with the high level of internal variety in outcome-based service systems. A typology for the identified 
relationships is developed, offering a helpful basis for the purposeful planning and design of interactions aimed at 
developing co-capability. The paper also offers theoretical propositions defining fundamental features of outcome-based 
service systems. The unique characteristics of these systems addressed in this paper provide particularly useful insights 
concerning the implementation of this type of servitization initiative not only in the defence industry, but also in other 
industrial sectors where servitization initiatives involve complex configurations of provider and customer organizations. 
 
Keywords: servitization, outcome-based service, complex services, viable service systems 
 
1. Introduction 
To remain competitive, manufacturing organizations have increasingly felt the need to provide uninterrupted 
availability of their equipment through services such as repair, maintenance and overhaul (Baines et al., 2007; 
Caldwell and Howard, 2011; Neely, McFarlane, and Visnjic, 2011). In a manufacturing context, the provision of 
services attached to core corporate offerings is commonly referred to as servitization (Vandermerwe and Rada, 
1988). Usually, most of the service contracts attached to manufacturers’ offerings are equipment-based, where 
the customer is invoiced for the time and materials involved in equipment repairs, maintenances and overhauls 
(van Weele, 2002; Lee, Yoo, and Kim, 2016). The performance of such contracts is typically assessed in terms 
of response time to breakdowns, speed of repairs, price (Crocker and Masten, 1991) and other activities where 
there is a measurable way to assess the provider’s performance (Dehoog, 1990). More recently, servitization 
has been defined as the implementation of services whose outcome is focused on capabilities delivered by 
product's performance (Baines et al., 2016). 
Of late, there have been a growing number of service contracts attached to equipment outcomes rather than 
on the traditional activities involved in the service of the equipment. For example, some of Rolls-Royce’s 
service contracts to maintain engines are paid on the basis of how many hours the engine is in the air – a 
concept known as “Power-by-the-Hour®” (Neely, 2008; Vendrell-Herrero and Wilson, 2016). Such outcome-
based contracts focus on achieving required outcomes rather than meeting a set of prescribed service levels 
(Bramwell, 2003). These forms of service contracts have brought an increased complexity to servitization 
developments, for achieving outcomes in the customer space places a requirement on the provider to have 
much closer cooperation and coordination with the customer, resulting in more tightly coupled linkages (Ng and 
Nudurupati, 2010). Despite the crucial role played by the customer, much of the servitization literature involving 
outcome-based service has focused upon aspects concerning the provider organization to achieve good 
service outcomes. There is therefore room for investigating issues concerning the involvement of the customer 
organization using the equipment.    
This paper addresses this gap by considering provider and customer organizations in a more holistic way 
                                                
1 Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)1604 893685. 
a University of Northampton, Northampton Business School, Boughton Green Rd, Northampton, UK. 
b University of Warwick, Warwick Manufacturing Group, Gibbet Hill Rd, Coventry, UK. 
c University of Surrey, University of Surrey Business School, Guildford, Surrey, UK. 
 
E-mail addresses:  Luciano.Batista@northampton.ac.uk (L. Batista), simondavis.poynter@googlemail.com (S. Davis-
Poynter), irene.ng@warwick.ac.uk (I. Ng), r.maull@surrey.ac.uk (R. Maull). 
Page 2 
 
when investigating the implementation of outcome-based service contracts by manufacturing firms. The holistic 
analysis takes into account relationship issues concerning the provider and the customer organization, rather 
than simply considering just the provider or the customer. More specifically, we investigate how provider and 
customer organizations achieve joint capability, i.e. co-capability, in outcome-based service contract initiatives, 
where tightly coupled interactions between the provider and the customer are critical to achieve service 
outcomes (Ng, Ding, and Yip, 2013). We argue that such a fundamental change to the value proposition of a 
service constitutes a major change in the configuration of the service system as a whole. 
The paper extends knowledge in servitization by providing a systems perspective of an outcome-based 
service initiative in the defence industry. We consider a viable systems approach as a theoretical lens to 
analyze the linkages between processes and functions operationalized within and between provider and 
customer organizations in order to deliver expected service outcomes. This is based on the notion that a 
system’s viability is determined by its capability to develop harmonic interactions between sub-systems and 
related supra-systems over time (Barile and Polese, 2010a; Golinelli, 2010; Pels et al., 2013). 
The research findings provide valuable insights into the interaction processes through which the harmonic 
behaviour of provider and customer organizations can be achieved. The findings suggest that intervening in the 
customer system to ensure structural and systemic stability reduces variability in the provider system and, 
therefore, in the service system as a whole. Assisting the customer organization to build competency also 
implies the provider’s participation in the customer system. We propose that a systemic development of 
customer/provider relationships enables the achievement of greater viability and stability of outcome-based 
service systems. The paper provides a typology of key relationships and their respective roles in this type of 
servitization. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we identify the main research gaps and key 
theoretical aspects underpinning the study. This is followed by the presentation of the research methodology. In 
the sequence, we discuss the research findings from a viable systems perspective of outcome-based services 
and define a typology of critical relationships to counteract variety in the service system. We conclude the 
paper by pointing out theoretical and practical contributions of the study and related issues for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical basis 
2.1. Outcome-based contracts (OBC) 
Servitization related literature suggest that a product service system (PSS) falls somewhere in a continuum 
of PSS categories varying from “pure product” to “pure service” systems (Tukker, 2004). On the “pure product” 
extreme, traditional product oriented service contracts are anchored on billable time and materials, with the 
cost of spare parts sometimes included in the maintenance, repair or overhaul of equipment, and the customer 
is billed for the service once the activities have been performed (van Weele, 2002). On the “pure service” 
extreme, services replace the purchase of a product, i.e. customers purchase not a product with services, but 
rather they are purchasing a service instead of the product (Cusumano, Kahl, and Suarez, 2015). Oliva and 
Kallenberg (2003) suggest that the last stage of this service continuum is expanding to relationship-based 
services, which calls for proper consideration of relationship aspects involving provider and customer 
organizations. For Bustinza et al. (2015), servitization represents a business-model change that involves 
organizational transformation from selling goods to selling an integrated combination of goods and services. 
The combination of goods and services into service contracts are predominantly result oriented and they are 
intended to achieve defined outcomes in terms of “availability” of products and related service resources. The 
service performance is rewarded on the basis of measurable outcomes in terms of timely availability to the 
customer (Neely, 2008). 
Contracting for availability seeks to sustain a service system at an agreed level of readiness over a period of 
time through partnering arrangements between the provider and the customer (Datta and Rajkumar, 2010). For 
Smith, Maull and Ng (2014), such partnerships require a mindset change where the customer expectations are 
carefully considered, particularly in outcome-based contract (OBC) contexts. 
OBC has been defined as a “contracting mechanism that allows the customer to pay only when the firm has 
delivered outcomes, rather than merely activities and tasks” (Ng, Maull, and Yip, 2009: 377). By definition, 
service outcome is the dominant value driver. The “availability” of products and related service resources is a 
necessary requisite for the achievement of outcomes and, as importantly, outcomes can only be achieved with 
the participation of the customer not only in terms of usage, but also in terms of allocating complementary 
resources (Ng et al., 2013). The service outcomes can be specified very broadly in terms of results, i.e. 
outcomes resulting from use, such as paying for every day that is incident-free in the security of a building, or 
they can be specified in terms of use, such as a bank of flying hours of a plane (Ng et al., 2009). 
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A recent study by Nordin and Kowalkowski (2010) showed that many providers underestimate the relational 
processes to engage customers. Firms’ inattention to these aspects arguably results in dissatisfied customers. 
They concluded that solution providers would benefit from replacing their product centric view of solutions with 
a relational process view. This view implies a strong emphasis on service value co-creation processes in which 
both the provider and the customer mutually align resources towards outcomes (Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002). 
In the OBC context, changing the focus from value capture to value co-creation entails the development of co-
capability in provider and customer systems to yield the expected outcomes as opposed to solutions where 
only the provider is responsible (Ng and Nudurupati, 2010).  
The inclusion of customer capabilities for a provider to achieve outcomes creates increased complexity in 
OBC service systems. Neely, McFarlane and Visnjic (2011) recognise value-in-use and value co-creation as 
key features of complexity in PSS. They propose that the product-service transition makes the underlying 
operational delivery systems and processes more complex to manage. Zhang, Gregory and Neely (2016) add 
that capability building may involve complex patterns of coordination, cooperation and integration between 
people and other resources. This is particularly the case in OBC systems. 
Recent studies on OBC have proposed that there is a need for understanding the different ways a firm is 
able to manage collaborations (Ng and Nudurupati, 2010; Ng et al., 2013), since the capability lies in the way a 
firm is able to achieve service outcomes collaboratively. This calls for further studies to identify underlying 
characteristics of provider-customer relationships in an OBC system and the related operational and 
managerial structure of its complex environment. 
From the aspects discussed above, it is possible to identify the following problems: 
-­‐ One sided perspectives of service systems such as product-oriented solutions do not provide a 
suitable theoretical basis for analyzing OBC systems. There is a lack of holistic approaches 
that capture the complexity of servitization through OBC as well as the integration aspects 
linking provider and customer organizations. 
-­‐ The dynamics between provider and customer relationships in servitized OBC contexts are not 
sufficiently understood. Since the service delivery capability is achieved in the way a firm is 
able to achieve customer outcomes collaboratively, there is a need for further studies that 
investigate the different ways a firm is able to manage collaborations and achieve co-capability. 
The research objectives were directly derived from these two issues, as follows: 
1. To analyze an OBC service system in a more integrative and holistic way, considering insights 
derived from a viable systems perspective to represent the complex structure of the system as 
a whole and the integration aspects linking provider and customer organizations. 
2. To identify relationship mechanisms that integrate provider and customer organizations and 
enable the achievement of co-capability in an OBC service system. 
 
2.2. Viable systems perspective 
The systems perspective is essentially helpful in understanding the inherent complexities of OBC service 
systems, for they involve intricate patterns of coordination, cooperation and integration between provider and 
customer resources and processes. The collaboration and integration between provider and customer to 
develop the co-capability necessary to achieve agreed service outcomes is ultimately a function of the totality 
of the parts, rather than just the individual elements. This is a primary notion of systems thinking, i.e. the notion 
that a system is a set of parts or elements that work with each other to form a whole (von Bertalanffy, 1968). 
The totality of the parts is intrinsically related to the boundary of a system and in an OBC system the 
boundary is extended beyond the firm to include the customer. A particular aspect concerning our research 
was the “viability” of OBC systems given the complexities involved. From the many models and perspectives 
one can draw from the systems literature, we have found that the classic Viable Systems Model (VSM) 
developed by Beer (1984) provided the narrative and the conceptual framework that were particularly useful to 
address the viability issues concerning the study. 
More specifically, the VSM provides a helpful reference for capturing the complex structures and linkages 
between core elements of a production system. Lowe et al. (2016), for example, have applied VSM as a basis 
to develop a theoretical framework to represent the functions required for a specific system to be effective in its 
environment and to provide insights into the processes and capabilities that enable guided interventions in a 
multi-organizational context. As pointed out by Barile et al. (2016), the multi-organizational perspective of VSM 
allows analysis beyond dyadic relationships to address the dynamics of systems and related networks involving 
complex business configurations and interaction patterns. Accordingly, we applied VSM to analyze the multi-
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organizational configuration and the viability conditions involved in the operational, managerial and governance 
dimensions of the OBC service system of interest. 
Beer (1981; 1984; 1985) has originally introduced the VSM and the principles of viable systems to describe 
the necessary conditions for viability, which is generally defined as the ability of a system to maintain its 
existence within a specific environment. We summarise here the key theoretical aspects of viable systems that 
underline the study. 
A first fundamental aspect is that contextual variations coming from the external environment of a system, 
as well as the multitude of events that may arise within the system itself, confront the system with “variety”. 
Contextual variety as described here is a measure of complexity, for it represents the number of different states 
in a system (Ashby, 1956). 
A second fundamental aspect considered in the study addresses the issue: How do organizations cope with 
variety? The answer builds directly upon Ashby’s (1956) law of requisite variety and, as Beer (1984) puts it, 
managing variety is the very essence of management. A system has requisite variety when it has subsystems 
or mechanisms to attenuate and amplify variety so that variety in the disturbance can be met with variety in the 
regulator. More specifically, the viability of a system fundamentally depends on the ability of its parts to 
attenuate or amplify variety so that the system as a whole can absorb (attenuate) and generate (amplify) as 
much variety as it receives. While attenuation decreases variety to the number of possible states a system can 
handle, amplification enhances variety to the number of possible states the system needs to remain fit to its 
environment (Holten and Rosenkranz, 2011). Both attenuation and amplification can take place between a 
system and its external environment as well as between the internal subsystems of the system; for example, 
between operations and management or between management and governance subsystems of a system. 
A third aspect of particular relevance to the research refers to the constituent parts of a viable system as 
proposed by Beer (1984) or, more specifically, the VSM structure. This is a particularly useful conceptual basis 
to structure our analysis around operational, managerial and governance elements of OBC service systems. 
The VSM describes the necessary organizational structure for a system to survive in a constantly changing 
environment (Holten and Rosenkranz, 2011). To be viable, an organization should have five core components 
(core systems) necessary to ensure viability. These five systems are also related to fundamental functions 
within organizations, as summarised below: 
• System 1 (S1) – Operations: It comprises the organizational units that carry out the operations 
activities. Each operational unit is responsible for conducting specific operations activities within 
the wider system being analyzed. 
• System 2 (S2) – Coordination: It is the system responsible for creating stability and resolving 
conflicts between the operational units. It comprises important supporting functions such as 
finance, human resources and information systems for the operations in S1, serving to restrain 
oscillations and disruptions that may occur between the units at operational level. 
• System 3 (S3) – Control: It is the system responsible for optimization, internal regulation, and 
generation of synergy between the operational units. S3 supervises the operational activities of 
S1 from a higher point of view, adjusting the allocation of resources to the operational units. In 
addition, a specific control system termed System 3* (S3*) is responsible for regularly checking 
the use of the assigned resources through an audit channel that informs System 3 about the 
state of affairs at the operational level. While S3 focuses more on controlling the allocation of 
resources, S3* mainly focuses on controlling the usage of the resources allocated. 
• System 4 (S4) – Planning: It is the system responsible for defining strategies and long-term 
forward planning that lead to adaptation to future trends in the external environment. 
• System 5 (S5) – Policy: It comprises the ultimate authority and ground rules for the system as a 
whole, establishing supreme values, policies and norms that apply to the whole system. 
As shown in Fig. 1, these core systems are connected via information channels that work as two-way 
communication loops of variety attenuators and amplifiers. Moreover, they recur within various instances of an 
organization, comprising critical organizational functions. For example, some systems focus on operational 
activities and decisions concerned with the internal environment (the “inside and now”), other systems focus on 
strategic decisions and actions concerning long-term adaptation to the external environment (the “outside and 
then”), and others focus on normative decisions and actions concerning the governance of the system as a 
whole. 
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Fig. 1. The Viable Systems Model – VSM (Adapted from Beer, 1984) 
 
 
 
 
Barile and Polese (2010a) have considered the survival capacity of viable systems in a constantly changing 
environment. Due to its coordination and control mechanisms, a viable system has the capacity to dynamically 
adjust its structure and behaviour to achieve consonance with its context and thus preserve its stability.  In 
essence this represents the homeostasis property of systems (von Bertalanffy, 1968), which refers to a 
system’s capability to adapt to external and internal disturbances (contextual variety) and restore its point of 
equilibrium in order to maintain stability and viability (Ashby, 1956). From a business perspective, homeostasis 
refers to a company’s ability to maintain its state of equilibrium by counteracting internal and external 
turbulences through adaptation, i.e. attenuation or amplification, of contextual variety (Beer, 1981). For 
instance, collaborative homeostats that ensure the continued viability of a system involve an organization’s 
ability to align its operations with its customer’s environment as well as the organization’s ability to achieve 
stability in terms of managing the present with focus on the future (Ng et al., 2012). Practical perspectives of 
this are, for example, the cooperative approach that some companies adopt to assure their competitiveness in 
the market (Vendrell-Herrero et al., 2016) or the introduction of new digital products that change provider-
customer relationships and allow the provider to gather data and learn from the client (Coreynen et al., 2016). 
Finally, a further theoretical aspect the study takes into account is derived from the work of Barile and 
Polese (2010a, 2010b). According to them, the management of a viable firm requires transformation of static 
structural relationships into dynamic interactions between sub- and supra-systems. They argue that “the ability 
to organize relationships demonstrates top management efficiency and is a main characteristic of viable 
systems” in business terms. These relationships enable what Barile and Polese (2010a) term as “consonant” 
(i.e. compatibility between the actors of a system) and “resonant” (i.e. harmonic interactions between actors) 
behaviours that reinforce the viability of the system as a whole. 
This can be linked with a particularly relevant aspect of OBC systems, which refers to the dynamic 
interactions between the provider and the customer to guarantee that the resources the system needs to 
achieve expected outcomes are properly integrated and allocated over time. Ng et al. (2013) recognize the 
critical importance of relationships in complex service systems. They argue that the building of co-capability in 
OBC systems requires all stakeholders to invest in relational assets that are both value-driven and partnership-
focused.  Relational governance assets comprising inter-organizational exchanges complemented by social 
relationships are particularly significant for consolidating cooperation, reducing costs, and enabling flexibility to 
facilitate adaptation to environmental changes. 
The theoretical aspects presented above provide the underlying principles, concepts and frameworks that 
guided the analysis conducted in the study. Specifically, the unity of analysis in the study is an OBC service 
system being implemented in the UK defence sector. It comprises, on one hand, large manufacturing 
organizations providing outcome-based services and, on the other hand, a customer organization involving 
different government departments and institutions. This complex structure involving provider and customer 
organizations is analyzed from a VSM perspective, where the system-in-focus comprises resources and 
processes of the provider firms and the supra-systems represent the customer controlled systems where the 
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providers’ resources are integrated with the customer’s resources, within the customer’s space, to achieve the 
expected outcomes. 
The VSM Systems S1 to S5 comprise the different operational, managerial and governance levels of the 
OBC system as a whole where provider and customer systems entwine, to a higher or lower degree, to achieve 
service outcomes collaboratively. Variety can be seen as the changing external and internal environmental 
circumstances faced by provider and customer organizations, and thus faced by the OBC system as a whole. 
Finally, the homeostatic elements in the system represent the mechanisms that enable transformational 
adjustments (i.e. attenuations and amplifications) implemented to face variety and therefore preserve the 
stability of the OBC system as a whole.   
 
3. Research methodology 
A case study approach was taken to develop the study. Qualitative research methods were used to derive 
insights from a specific OBC service system, including structures, processes, personnel and interactions 
involving provider and customer organizations. In conformity with qualitative research strategies (Bryman, 
2012), we employed a variety of techniques such as observation, analysis of texts and documents, interviews, 
and recording/transcribing to extract data for the purpose of understanding and analysis. The logic behind 
using multiple methods is to achieve an in-depth understanding of the dynamics arising from service delivery 
through OBC (the phenomenon in question) and related operational and managerial contexts. 
The provider and customer organizations in the case were selected according to theoretical sampling of 
single cases (Yin, 1994), where the organizations were purposefully targeted because they featured 
comprehensive examples of OBC implementation initiatives and provided ample opportunity for research 
access (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The organizations in the case were also involved in an 
unprecedented servitization initiative through an OBC comprising two large manufacturing corporations and the 
British Ministry of Defence (see Section 3.1). This created a timely phenomenal opportunity for scientific 
investigation of the subject in the defence industry. Given the scale and the complexity of the operations and 
organizational structures involved, the VSM represented a suitable framework to address viability issues 
concerning the systems perspective of the phenomenon. 
In the case, the OBC service contracted was fully operational by 2012. Primary data was collected from 
semi-structured interviews in that period. 50 managers from provider and customer organizations were 
interviewed in face-to-face sessions that lasted two hours in average. The interviews were audio-recorded and 
subsequently transcribed, coded and categorised with the support of the software QSR NVivo 10. The 
participants were highly knowledgeable managers selected in a balanced way (similar numbers) from provider 
and customer organizations and from key departments and hierarchical levels linked to operations, strategic 
management and governance activities. The themes developed in the interviews referred to the circumstances 
in which services are required, the operational implementation of services, the joint allocation of resources to 
achieve service outcomes, relationship aspects, and how decisions and strategies are made and 
communicated within and between organizations. 
Inductive coding was used as the constant comparison analysis method (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2007) 
applied to identify codes emerging from the entire dataset. This method is commonly used when a researcher 
is interested in utilizing an entire dataset to identify underlying themes emerging from the data (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). The emerged themes were systematically matched to theoretical aspects concerning 
systems variety, adaptations (from the perspective of attenuations and amplifications) and relationships. 
Guba’s (1981) credibility qualities of trustworthiness in qualitative research were observed by the study. 
Accordingly, (1) trackable variability was ascribed to sources in which variability stem from the range of 
experience rather than the average experience; (2) data was collected from, and peer examined by, persons 
who are familiar with the phenomenon being studied; and (3) triangulation of data source also involved 
persistent observation on service sites. As suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985), the latter activity included 
prolonged engagement, i.e. adequate submersion in the research settings to enable recurrent patterns to be 
identified and verified. The investigators were responsive and adaptable to changing circumstances, with 
professional immediacy, sensitivity and ability for clarification and summarization. 
 
3.1. The context of the Study 
In the study, a major outcome-based service contract system involving the UK MoD - Ministry of Defence 
(the customer organization), and two major manufacturers (the providers) in the defence industry was 
investigated. The provider organizations are two prime manufacturers of fast jet aircraft and engines in the 
military aviation and defence industry. The service contract specifies expected outcomes in terms of availability 
of aircrafts and related engines and mission systems. The companies support the British fleet of Tornado 
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military aircraft and their engines, as well as the new Typhoon military aircraft fleet, which is set to gradually 
replace the Tornado fleet over the years. 
Typical of OBC, the service performance is rewarded on the basis of measurable outcomes in terms of the 
timely availability to the RAF (Royal Air Force) of aircraft (available flying hours) and engines, spares, trained 
maintenance personnel, and technical advice. The service contract was described by all parties as “partnered 
support contracts”, which involves a degree of co-location of customer and supplier at either the customer’s or 
the supplier’s premises, and were facilitated by the supplier’s day-to-day use of “Government Furnished 
Assets” (jargon termed “GFx”) including personnel, facilities, spares, services and data provided by the MoD. 
The OBC service system operates under complex relationships between providers and customer entities, since 
the service delivery requires both parties (providers and customers) to focus on achieving outcomes. That is, 
the customer co-produces with the providers to achieve the expected outcomes. 
 
3.2. Applying the VSM framework onto the OBC service context 
To facilitate understanding of the complex service system being studied, the VSM provided the theoretical 
framework for investigation of interactive processes between key personnel, main activities, organizational 
structures and the ability of both the provider and the customer to co-create activities to achieve expected 
outcomes. Homeostatic aspects in the system represented the adjustment mechanisms implemented by both 
provider and customer to achieve co-capability. 
As mentioned, the system-in-focus comprises the providers’ system of equipment provision and availability, 
and the supra-systems are where the providers’ equipment and various other resources are integrated within 
the customer’s space for use in combination with customer’s resources to achieve the expected outcomes. The 
supra-systems are controlled by the customer at a recursion level above the system-in-focus. Understanding 
the supra-system that is controlled by the customer therefore allows an understanding of the variety faced by 
the system-in-focus. 
In practice, the VSM helped to depict the structure of the OBC service system in a holistic way, including 
main operational and managerial components as well as the information and communication channels between 
the key components of the system involving the providers and customers. The framework was essentially 
useful for making organizational structures and links visible and comparable in terms of operational, managerial 
and governance processes. 
 
 
4. Research findings 
An initial examination of the OBC origins and background in the subject context revealed that the MoD 
reached towards “partnering” with its major industry suppliers as a contractual philosophy through intuition and 
an extension of practice and precedent rather than from any robust theoretical foundation. The rationale for 
OBC adoption was simply that traditional maintenance, repair and overhaul contract models were demonstrably 
wasteful and leading inexorably towards an unaffordable future. In fact, a recent study by Lee, Yoo and Kim 
(2016) revealed that servitization is a more cost-efficient strategy when the goods involved require a high level 
of service, which is the case of the RAF defence fleets. Moreover, at least for the Tornado fleet, which have 
been in operation for a number of years, there would be a reliance on both customer manpower and equipment 
resources, i.e. GFx that was best managed jointly. In terms of manpower, there were severe doubts that the 
industry providers could resource all of the necessary trained maintenance technicians from the local economy 
at a reasonable price. 
From the perspective of the OBC system, the high degree of contextual variety is represented by an 
increase in the heterogeneity of the contexts that deviate from the most likely contexts of use for which the 
service was originally designed. For instance, investigation of contextual variety in the operational systems 
showed that modern warfare is expeditionary in nature, requiring aircrafts to be deployed to varying locations 
where they and their supporting cast of aircrew and ground-crew may be put in harm’s way. Also, fast jet 
aircrafts are complex engineering systems, densely packed with mechanical, electro-mechanical, electric, 
hydraulic, and electronic equipment that are required to operate at the top of their performance range in a far 
from benign environment in terms of temperature and vibration.  As a consequence, they develop faults far 
more frequently than their civilian equivalents operated in far more sedate environments. Furthermore, to ease 
the maintainability of so densely packed products, a philosophy of repair by replacement of “line replaceable 
items” (LRIs), i.e. items consisting of a cluster of parts that can be taken out when component parts are faulty, 
has evolved. This approach creates a modular boundary for changing systemic components that was a trade-
off between what is efficient for the maintainer and effective, in terms of time, for the customer. This also 
resolved the tension between squadron operations and off-aircraft repair sites, and a potential cost resulting 
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from “information hiding” regarding the LRI’s usage and its fault history. For example, it is not uncommon for an 
LRI to be removed from an aircraft only to be diagnosed as “no fault found” when tested in the repair bay. It is 
not unreasonable for this LRI to be returned to service in this case, as it has been removed by mistake through 
erroneous front-line diagnosis.  However, from a customer perspective, it would be unreasonable for the same 
LRI to cycle back and forth to the repair bay without some alternative intervention. A contractor paid by a fixed 
amount per “repair” may see it otherwise. 
These findings confirm that contextual variety threatens the stability of the system and challenges co-
creation for outcome achievement. This calls for a more in-depth analysis of operational elements and 
homeostatic processes developed to keep the viability of the system. As mentioned, we have applied the VSM 
to support such analysis. 
 
4.1. VSM Analysis 
Many previous studies have applied the VSM to analyze, describe, explain, and understand organization 
structures and related structural relationships (Holten and Rosenkranz, 2011; Jackson, 2000; Kawalek and 
Wastell, 1999; Vidgen, 1998). In this study, we used the VSM to investigate functions, structures, and links 
(relationships) involving both the provider and the customer organizations in the OBC service systems 
examined. The model was used to depict the structural design and relational links involving the system-in-focus 
and related supra-systems at different recursive levels for the Tornado and the Typhoon OBC. 
The technologies of the aircrafts and related engines/avionics (electronic equipment fitted in the aircraft) for 
the Tornado and the Typhoon fleet present different features. Despite the technological differences, the general 
operational, managerial and governance structures deployed to deliver the OBC service for both fleets are 
similar. It is possible thus to describe the service system configuration for both fleets analogously, with basis on 
the classic VSM model. Fig. 2 shows the VSM structure for the major operational and related 
managerial/governance systems of the OBC system studied. 
 
Fig. 2. The VSM for the OBC system studied 
 
 
A key aspect of the system shown in Fig. 2 is that, despite having clear objectives, the component systems 
(S1 to S5) are not implemented by the provider or the customer exclusively. They all involve a degree of 
resources jointly allocated by the provider and the customer organisations. For instance, at S1 system level 
equipment availability is mainly operationalized through the propulsion and aircraft support processes as well 
as logistics and spares management processes. These processes are predominantly led by the provider, but 
they also require personnel, premises and data from the customer organisation. By their turn, governance 
processes at S5 level are predominantly led by the customer, but they also require personnel and data from the 
provider. 
 
 4.1.1. Systems S1 to S5 in the OBC Studied 
In the model, S1 comprises the main operations that deliver the OBC outcomes. According to Beer (1981), 
S1 operations justify the existence of the system as a whole. It includes the management of the operations, but 
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excludes senior management, which is comprised by other systems in the VSM. In the context of the OBC 
studied, S1 encompasses operations such as maintenance of aircrafts and related engines/avionics to 
guarantee equipment availability. It also includes management of the capability of repair bays in order to 
ensure rapid turnaround of LRIs, as well as logistics and inventory management of part spares to ensure that 
they are available for repair activities and the operations do not suffer from shortages. One respondent 
summarized S1 operations as:  
“…in terms of repair solutions, they involve the engineers that drive these reliability improvement 
programs as we move forward... They’re the, sort of, key areas, engineering, inventory and 
maintenance. So, that’s really my value stream, effectively.” (Operations Manager, provider) 
System S2 coordinates resources and processes between the various operations and recursions in S1. It 
works as a regulatory centre for each of the S1 components and it also comprises an overseeing regulatory 
centre at senior management level that links the internal coordination of S1 with the higher managerial 
instances. This gives S2 the ability and authority to handle resolution of conflicts between the various activities 
taking place in S1, toning down disruptions and ensuring that interactions are kept stable. In the OBC context 
studied, S2 conducts relevant service support functions for S1, such as information systems and IT services, 
finance, human resources, engineering authority, and supply chain functions from provider and customer 
organizations. An example of S2 level management process is: 
“I do manage the distribution of resources through the operational units according to their planned 
demand and mission priority. Unexpected missions may require quick changes that conflict with 
previously planned resource allocations. By managing resources at a level slightly above the 
operational units we are able to deal with these conflicts.” (Inventory Manager, provider) 
By its turn, System S3 has an executive function, supervising the coordination activities of S2, as well as 
controlling and auditing resources and processes in S1. It is the key controlling bridge between the activities in 
S1 and S2 and the top management activities in S4 and S5. The audit channel S3* allows S3 to obtain more 
elaborated audit information, rather than relying on information provided by operational divisions only. By 
comprising activities such as accounting, production planning and control, and audit rules, resources and 
rights, S3 supervises all internal operational activities from a higher point of view of the total system. It leads 
resource bargaining and lobbying, which includes negotiation of resource allocation to the operations, and 
regular checking of the use of resources. This is illustrated by the comments below from a respondent in S3:  
“…if we decide that we should spend less money on engineers and more money on supply chain 
people, for instance, we can make that choice and I’m the ultimate approver and authoriser that 
can move that money from one place to the next…I’m balancing cost and performance, so I’m the 
person who’s actually, if you like, putting the brakes on for people who want to spend any amount 
of money to achieve any amount of performance.  I’m the person saying no, no, no, we only need 
to provide 17 aircraft this month.  There’s no reason to provide 18, don’t spend the money”. 
(Finance Director, provider) 
System S4 is concerned with the external environment of the system. It can be seen as the “external eye” of 
the system as whole, being responsible for monitoring the external environment, assessing threats and 
opportunities, and making plans to ensure that the system can adapt to a changing environment. It comprises 
strategy and marketing functions, which give S4 the ability to scan the environment, forecast a future and plan 
for it. The close link with S3 allows S4 to have a clear view of the current state of affairs in the system and to 
plan its future state, including definition of future resources and development of new service offerings. The 
intelligence processes in S4 address eventualities, perspectives and responsibilities that are beyond the sight 
of managers in other systems. As an S4 level manager puts it, 
“We do all the forecasting and planning for the avionics value stream, which means we try to pull 
together the whole end-to-end service for avionics, so from, you know, the support of the 
equipment off-base to spares, planning for its management of the brought out budget and then just 
for a delivery of the avionics availability.” (Director, provider) 
Finally, System S5 applies established policy and ethos to ensure a balanced interaction between S3 and 
S4 and that the system as a whole function within policy guidelines. Ultimately, the strategic governance of the 
entire OBC service system sits within S5, where board of directors’ activities take place. In the OBC studied, 
the board comprised members from the MoD linked to the higher echelon of military institutions, and from the 
contractors linked to the higher echelons of their company. An example of S5 level role is: 
“We are looking for as much synergies as we can between Tornado and Typhoon… the key 
challenges that I’ve got is (a) operating across different stakeholder groups; and (b) trying to find 
ways of standardising two very distinctly different products…So, the approach at the moment is to 
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try to come up with a single business, multi-product way of operating.” (Government Officer, 
customer) 
 
4.1.2. Boundary Fuzziness 
When analyzing the creation of co-capabilities in the service system, we have observed a peculiar feature of 
the OBC system concerning its boundaries. Usually, the essential activities from S1 to S5 involve integration of 
processes and resources from the provider and the customer organizations. Such integration enables the 
achievement of outcomes by the OBC system as a whole, rather than by one single organization. An OBC 
system can therefore be seen as a service system interlinking provider and customer systems whose 
boundaries overlap in order to achieve the expected OBC outcomes. In this sense, the classic systems' 
perspective of organizations whose system boundary places customer resources in an environment external to 
the system-in-focus (Katz and Khan, 1966) does not necessarily apply in an OBC setting where the boundaries 
of distinct organizations (provider and customer) entwine in a fuzzy way to form a broader complex service 
system of collaborative outcomes. 
We have found that the fuzzy boundaries of provider and customer systems embraced by an OBC service 
system are a source of ownership problems as there is no central control. As some respondents put it: 
• “The [contract] doesn’t have a strong tree [sic] which is in a system perspective; there is no 
ownership of the availability system.” (Operations manager, provider, S2 level)  
• “…the ownership [of the system] is not at an enterprise level… at multiple levels there has 
been a dilution in terms of ownership and accountability.” (Engineer authority, customer, S5 
level) 
In fact, in an OBC system the provider and the customer systems are intertwined in many circumstances. 
Considering customer resources as being in an external system makes no sense in an OBC context, where 
GFx (Government Furnished resources) including personnel, facilities, spares, services and data are jointly 
managed by the provider and customer on a daily basis. Hence, in OBC systems the boundaries of the system-
in-focus extend to include that of the customer and, as organizational boundaries become fuzzy, considering 
the scope of the system in terms of its overall purpose rather than its organizational borders holds together the 
many processes and resources from both organizations within a rational space. 
The boundary fuzziness is however less characteristic at S5 level of an OBC service system.  More 
specifically, despite involving provider resources (i.e. top executives of contractors’ higher echelons) S5 is a 
governance system that predominantly consists of customer resources and processes. This reflects what was 
found during the research: The co-located provider and customer delivery teams were generally quite close-
coupled, but their respective higher management echelons were less coupled. For this reason, the 
organizational boundaries are more visible in S5 compared to the organizational boundaries of the other 
systems. Nonetheless, the purpose of the system is still a crucial aspect to be considered in all instances, as 
without a purpose it is impossible to define a system boundary (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). 
 
4.2. Variety Aspects 
Further findings from the study relate to the high level of internal variety in the system not in terms of 
requisite variety implemented, but in terms of variety internally generated by distinct organizations (provider 
and customer) acting together in the OBC service system. This can be explained by the fact that OBC service 
systems typically have a substantial number of processes which are carried out jointly by the provider and the 
customer in different functions and recursive levels. As mentioned before, the ownership of such processes is 
in several circumstances unclear for the organizations involved and this is likely to be hindering consistency of 
resources across functions, convergence of assumptions and expectations, control and coordination of 
processes, and negotiation of priorities. Moreover, there is also performance variability in terms of the way the 
contract is measured (i.e. contract performance), as evidenced by the respondents’ comments below: 
•  “We do suffer quite a lot of disruption... sometimes the [contract] picture isn’t particularly 
clear and sometimes it’s very, very clear, but we do suffer from quite a lot of disruption but 
it comes from a variety of sources because we have multiple stakeholders.” (Engineer, 
provider, S2 level) 
•  “…the contract doesn’t stay the same, it’s constantly being changed… so more and more 
things are coming into the contract and… so the baseline changes constantly as we move 
forward.” (Account Manager, provider, S3 level) 
Page 11 
 
As a consequence of this variety, many different KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) are applied to measure 
equipment availability, including spares delivered at different recursion levels involving different stakeholders. 
For instance, in terms of delivery of spares, the variability of KPIs is driven by the thousands of parts and 
related components in LRIs necessary to guarantee availability of aircraft fleet. The overall performance of the 
contract is therefore affected by this wide variety of components and units to be repaired or maintained at 
operational level. This contributes to an increase in the level of internal variety faced by both the provider and 
the customer. This aspect is evidenced by a number of managers who were interviewed in the study. We 
highlight below some of the opinions that corroborate this potential problem in OBC systems: 
• “decisions are not rational… we have real issues and that’s where a considerable amount of 
the disruption comes from” (Finance Manager, customer, S3 level) 
• “I think we get the best information that’s available, but there’s so much uncertainty within 
government” (IT Manager, provider, S2 level) 
• “the way they’re structured is not aligned to the advance in technology and it’s not aligned to 
the world politics” (Marketing Manager, provider, S4 level) 
• “you’ll have people that have very strong political or business views that will heavily influence 
the systems at different levels and in fact, possibly even, at all levels” (Senior Government 
Officer, customer, S5 level) 
Further analysis of individual agents and their interactions across managerial functions at different recursion 
levels of the OBC service system for Tornado and Typhoon revealed that to deal with the high level of internal 
variety in particular, as well as the variety coming from the external environment, managers from the provider 
and customer organizations interact on a regular basis through formal and informal relationships instances. 
These interactions proved to be a crucial mechanism to sustain the viability of the system as a whole. This 
interesting aspect of an OBC system is also a good example of how human resources are used to “attenuate” 
the impact of variety in the system. For example, by monitoring and engaging with the customer on a regular 
basis the provider creates opportunities to attenuate internal contextual variety. Our study expands on this 
aspect by specifying a typology of key relationships in OBC contexts, as discussed next. 
 
4.3. Critical Relationships in OBC Systems 
Mechanisms to deal with the law of requisite variety as well as the design of structural sub-systems and 
related communication channels are central to VSM applications (Vidgen, 1998). The communication channels 
deal with internal variety between sub-systems in homeostatic loops aimed at balancing interactions. These 
interactions are manifested through relationships between individual agents from different managerial functions 
and levels of the system. 
Our research findings confirmed that OBC systems involve complex relationships between customers and 
service providers that rely heavily on tangible (equipment) and intangible (knowledge and experiences) 
resources as well as information-based relational assets to achieve the outcomes of the contract. The findings 
point out key relationships that fundamentally determine the performance of the contract, acting as 
mechanisms that allow the provider to intervene in the customer-controlled supra-system in order to ensure 
structural and systemic stability, therefore reducing variety not only in the system-in-focus, but also in the 
supra-system.  
Moreover, the key relationships identified in the study allow strategic and operational alignment between the 
firm and the customer systems in order to achieve OBC outcomes. From a systems perspective, the 
relationships between the firm and the customer can be seen as homeostat mechanisms that ensure the 
continued viability of the system. They absorb variety by allowing the firm to align its tangible (e.g. material and 
manpower) and intangible (e.g. expertise) resources with complementary resources provided by the customer. 
Specifically, the relationships identified seem to be an efficient way to guarantee the availability of resources 
in the OBC system. They reinforce the coordination and harmonization between the system-in-focus and the 
customer-controlled supra-system, maximizing co-capability achievements. They are practical examples of how 
a system can create consonant (creation of compatibility between provider and customer) and resonant 
(development of harmonic interactions between provider and customer) behaviours that sustain the viability of 
the system as a whole (Barile and Polese, 2010a; Golinelli, 2010). 
Table 1 provides a typology for the critical relationships we have identified in the study. In general, these 
relationships influence the congruence of expectations between the parties involved, the consistency of 
resources allocated, their complementary competencies, the convergence of assumptions and expectations, 
the control and coordination of processes, and the negotiation of priorities. 
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Table 1. Critical Relationships in OBC Systems 
Relationship type Purpose 
Check resource 
consistency 
To check internally whether there is consistency in resources (e.g. manpower, budget, materials, 
etc.) that need to be available for yielding an expected outcome. This is important because in the 
military context of the OBC studied, customer personnel can be redeployed for different missions. 
Since outcome achievement is co-resourced (i.e. manpower from the customer is used), this 
relationship asset ensures that the necessary manpower was consistently available so that 
outcomes are not compromised. 
Check 
assumptions 
To ensure that the provider and the customer have the same assumptions about the future, the 
missions and the outcomes to be achieved. 
Negotiate priorities To establish clear priorities of actions. In times when resources may need to be redistributed, 
especially when mission capabilities require resource peaks, this relationship asset keeps the 
communication channel open so that priorities could be negotiated or renegotiated to lower the 
cost of resource use variety (e.g. peak time may require more resources which are costly).  
Develop harmony To set proper expectations, i.e. calm people down. This relationship asset tries to synchronise 
views and perspectives around specific outcomes to be achieved. 
Lag control To manage expectations concerning lead time. This relationship asset makes teams aware of the 
time necessary to deliver specific tasks and potential delays ahead. 
Gather intelligence To specify future implications and consequences of current actions and situations. It is also 
related to lag control because if you have more intelligence about delivery times, you can 
anticipate and lower the cost of lag. 
 
It is important to mention that these relationships are mainly tacit initiatives developed through formal and 
social interactions between provider and customer members of staff at the management level, i.e. coordination 
(S2), control (S3), planning (S4), and policy (S5) levels. They represent homeostatic loops that enable the 
development of co-capability in the OBC system. The manager’s comment below provides an illustration of this 
aspect.  
“I’ve built strong relationships, obviously, in the maintenance world, in the inventory world and in 
the engineering world… those relationships are very important to me. They’re working 
relationships that are being [developed] effectively… I already had relationships with these 
people, but what’s happening now is, because of the value stream, we’re going to look at co-
location, which is a very important move, as far as I’m concerned, to get the integrated working 
that we need…” (Project Manager, provider, S2 level) 
Another important point to consider is the balance between competition and cooperation across the 
organizations involved in the OBC service system. Previous studies have found that trust is more likely to be 
sustained in geographically concentrated networks, in the sense that firms within networks benefit from the 
reciprocal exchange of information and the benefits of collaboration can overcome the negative externalities of 
competition (Newlands, 2003). In the context of the OBC system studied, providers and customers are 
geographically collocated in many operational instances of the service and the achievement of co-capability is 
an inherent concern of the management teams. The many operational and managerial networks involved in the 
OBC system very likely favor the development of the relationships above described. 
 
5. Conclusions 
5.1. Theoretical contributions 
This research makes important contributions to the servitization theory to explain service implementation by 
manufacturing firms through OBC. A first important point is that servitization through OBC requires a mindset 
change towards service value co-creation. Nordin and Kowalkowski (2010) argue that solution providers would 
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benefit from replacing their product centric view of solutions with a relational process view. We agree with their 
view and add that viewing OBCs as product-oriented solutions is too “reductionistic” in assuming that the 
gradual aggregation of service steps in the offered solution makes the whole. What this view fails to take into 
account is the complex interactions that result from adding service components. For example, in the case of 
moving from selling surveillance cameras to offering 24-hour security, the provider will certainly want extremely 
low failure rates in the camera, probably more secure communication and to train security staff on how to 
monitor for suspicious activity. All of this requires a complete reconfiguration of product design that will also 
include discussing with the customer the location of cameras and staff. From these aspects, we derived the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1: Servitization through OBC requires a shift from a product-centric view of 
solutions to a relational-process view of solutions. 
In other words, the product-centric view of service does not fit servitization through OBC, which requires a 
relational-process view of solutions where co-capability is a fundamental requisite. This reinforces evidence of 
previous research suggesting that customers prefer solutions that include provider-customer relationship 
processes to facilitate the definition of customer requirements, customization of services and post deployment 
support (Tuli et al., 2007). Moreover, the relational-process view fits the advanced manufacturer’s service 
category suggested by Baines et al. (2013), in which the range of service activities stretches beyond production 
competences to take on activities that are internal to the customer. Indeed, in the OBC service system we 
analyzed many of the provider’s servitized operations shown in Fig. 2 take place at RAF facilities and are 
implemented with the support of RAF staff.     
Another important contribution of the research sheds light on how major manufacturers in the defence 
industry are developing servitization initiatives through OBC systems. The implementation of OBC in this sector 
is a response to market demand for more cost effective service systems. It represents a distinctive servitization 
format that fits Cusumano, Kahl and Suarez’s (2015) view that the way firms servitize is contingent on industry 
evolution and characteristics. We agree with this point of view and add that, due to their expeditionary nature, 
OBC service systems in the defence sector is also contingent on short term variations in the environmental 
circumstances faced by the system. 
Such contingent variety brings increased complexity to OBC service systems, where variations may arise 
from changes not only in the external environment, but also in the internal environment. The internal variations 
originate either from the provider or from the customer themselves, as suggested in previous studies 
(Palmatier, 2008). In this sense, variations from the customer sphere do not necessarily represent external 
variety faced by the system. Considering that (1) the study shows high level of internal variety in OBC service 
systems and (2) in OBC systems the customer is an important active element jointly delivering the service, we 
derive a second proposition as follows. 
Proposition 2: In servitization initiatives through OBC systems, variety arising from the customer 
organization is mainly an issue of internal variety, rather than variety originated from the external 
environment. 
Following from this proposition, a further important outcome of the research refers to the critical 
relationships that can purposefully deal with the high level of internal variety in OBC systems. Previous studies 
have acknowledged the importance of relationships in servitized contexts (Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003; 
Coreynen et al., 2016; Vendrell-Herrero et al., 2016). For instance, the development of provider-customer 
relationships is essential to cooperative approaches in servitization initiatives (Vendrell-Herrero et al. 2016). 
Bastl et al. (2012) have found that buyer-supplier relationships allow more open exchange of information 
between the parties and strengthen operational linkages. For Kastalli and Van Looy (2013), servitization 
requires greater provider-customer interactions, which lead to more detailed knowledge of customer needs as 
well as improved service development and engineering work. By their turn, Sacanni, Visintin, and Rapaccini 
(2014) have found that the technical information needed by a supplier should be coupled with an increasing 
degree of knowledge of customers and their processes. This can be illustrated by the digital integrations that 
some providers develop with the purpose of improving their learning capabilities regarding customer needs and 
preferences (Coreynen et al., 2016). The aspects above entail an increase in the amount of information 
exchanged between provider and customer, as well as the establishment of relationship-specific adaptations. 
We add to these studies by emphasizing the ‘purposefulness’ and the ‘criticality’ of such relationships, which 
we elaborate in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: The development of purposeful relationships between the firm and the customer 
are critical to guarantee the viability of servitization initiatives through OBC. 
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Furthermore, the study specifies critical relationships (Table 1) through which attenuation and amplification 
adjustments in a service system can be continuously planned and designed, enabling co-capability and 
organizational flexibility for adaptive delivery of equipment availability in more cost-efficient ways. This links to 
Holten and Rosenkranz’s (2011) argument that attenuators and amplifiers need to be designed. When they are 
not designed, they will occur because Ashby’s law asserts itself (Beer, 1981); however, in this case variety is 
balanced at a greater cost. 
A final important outcome of the research is the identification of potential process ownership problems 
related to organizational boundary fuzziness. The phenomenon of boundary fuzziness is a consequence of the 
substantial number of processes flowing across different functional areas requiring co-capability and co-
location of tangible and intangible assets (e.g. materials, infra-structure, people, information and knowledge) 
from the provider and customer organizations in order to achieve expected service outcomes. Not 
uncommonly, the ownership of many processes in the system becomes unclear because of the complex 
configuration of the joint activities, interactions and structures involving the provider and the customer in 
several operational and managerial instances of the OBC system. 
To deal with this problem, it is essentially important, particularly in OBC systems, to consider the notion of 
system purpose as proposed by Forrester (1968). He argued that a fundamental basis for identifying and 
organizing a system structure is to have a proper and sharp definition of the purpose of the system. With basis 
on this premise, we derive the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: Organizational boundary fuzziness is an inherent feature of OBC service systems, 
in which the operational, managerial and governance functions should be primarily determined by 
the systems’ purpose and not limited by organizational boundaries. 
 
5.2. Managerial contributions 
 In order to shed light on the systems features of OBC services, the study develops a VSM structuration of 
the phenomenon, revealing the operational, managerial and governance structures necessary to preserve the 
functional viability of the system. By doing so the study provides a pioneering VSM perspective of OBC 
systems being deployed as major servitization initiatives taking place in the defence area. 
The outcomes from the VSM analysis provide useful managerial insights. For instance, one general 
outcome identifies the functionalities of critical component systems (S1 to S5) in the OBC, which can be used 
as a valuable reference in the management of future servitization initiatives, where similar operational, control 
and governance structures can be replicated. We have found the model particularly helpful to represent the 
complex structure of the large scope of the OBC system being implemented in the defence sector, where 
systems S1 to S5 can be more clearly represented. However, in servitization initiatives of reduced scope 
implemented by SMEs for example, S2 to S5 systems are usually merged into more general management 
structures. In this case, the component systems would not be clearly identified through the VSM framework. 
The research has also shown that when an organization is contracting for outcomes, relationships are a key 
factor in the performance of the contract. The typology of key relationships specified in the study provides a 
helpful reference for provider and customer organizations involved in OBC systems to develop vital interactions 
in a more purposeful fashion, rather than on an ad hoc basis. The relationships can potentially act as practical 
mechanisms that allow the provider to engage with the customer-controlled supra-system, creating intervention 
opportunities for the firm and, this way, absorbing the variety faced by the service system. Consequently the 
viability of the system as a whole is reinforced. The relationships can also be seen as the means through which 
the provider can assist the customer organization to adjust resources and materials necessary to achieve 
contract outcomes. Such systemic interactions build co-capability competence in terms of equipment use by 
customer and provider, allowing therefore the achievement of greater viability and stability for long-term 
equipment outcomes. Following from these aspects, we can conclude that to guarantee availability of 
resources in an OBC system, the management should reinforce the coordination and harmonization of the 
relationships across different functions and levels of the system in order to maximize the contributions made by 
both the provider and the customer. 
Process ownership is a potential problem that should be dealt with appropriately. Problems concerning 
process ownership in manufacturing companies have been identified in previous research (Kohlbacher and 
Gruenwald, 2011), where empirical evidence suggests that managers should develop efforts to establish 
process owners. Yet, the issue remains to be further explored in the servitization context. Because co-
capability is fundamentally required in OBC service systems, we imply (Proposition 4) that organizational 
boundary fuzziness is an inherent feature of OBC systems and related process ownership problems should be 
dealt with through a purposeful definition of the functional systems and the development of relationship 
mechanisms that enable dynamic adjustments of joint capabilities. Because they support contingent 
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adjustments, we argue (Proposition 3) that these relationship mechanisms are critical to the implementation of 
OBC service operations. 
Moreover, a peculiar aspect of the issues concerning process ownership and the implementation of 
relationship mechanisms in OBC service systems is that they involve the customer organization. As the 
customer in this context is an internal element of the system, the issues relate to internal variety (Proposition 
2). By being internal, the problem allows a higher degree of managerial control when compared with external 
elements of the system. 
 
5.3. Limitations and further research 
The research here reported is not exempt from limitations. For instance, generalizations from case studies 
are context dependent. In this respect our findings are context specific and might not reflect the majority of 
outcome-based contracts. Specifically, the OBC system we analyzed comprises a service contract involving the 
UK Ministry of Defence and two major manufacturers in the defence industry. This represents a market 
configuration close to a monopsony with a duopoly scenario, where the competition level is most likely low. 
Conventional economic theory states that competition is a state characterized by the absence or minimization 
of monopoly rents and, conversely, when there are few buyers and providers they may collaborate in order to 
avoid external competition (Kurz, 2016). Our findings provide evidence of inter-organizational collaborations 
being developed with the intrinsic objective of achieving co-capability to deliver the service contracted. 
However, the market context of the organizations may also influence the motivations for the collaboration 
initiatives taking place in the phenomenon analyzed. A different perspective of this issue is that while 
collaboration provides opportunities for firms to pull resources together, the overriding imperative of their 
motivations remains that of being competitive in the market (Newlands, 2003). In this sense, the decision to 
develop closer relationships with others might involve a trade-off between the benefits of mutual collaboration 
and the potential loss of competitive advantage. Research exploring the tensions between collaboration and 
competition in servitization initiatives through OBC would be valuable. 
Overall, the methodology and outcomes of this study provide insightful basis for the development of future 
research that could apply a similar approach. Although external generalizability cannot be claimed for this 
study, our investigation contributes to analytic generalization, i.e. our abstractions and findings contribute to the 
theory of the phenomenon being studied, a theory that may have much wider applicability than the particular 
case studied (Maxwell, 2005; Yin, 2003). In practical terms, the unique characteristics of OBC service systems 
which are addressed in this paper provides particularly useful insights concerning the implementation of this 
type of servitization initiative not only in the defence industry, but also in other industrial sectors where 
servitization initiatives involve complex configurations of provider and customer organizations. 
The VSM analysis here developed has widespread applicability, for it can be applied to facilitate the 
understanding of service systems with high level of complexity. As Beer (1985) stated, the unit of analysis 
might be a firm, a consortium or even a national economy. This gives rise to a consideration of the VSM 
framework across a networked organizational structure in further research on servitization through OBC. In this 
paper it is not our intention to argue that VSM provides a better theoretical basis to explain servitization through 
OBC phenomena. We aim to provide a VSM perspective that is original per se and to offer the academic and 
practitioner community a supplementary perspective to explain a complex servitization phenomenon. We do 
acknowledge that other theoretical backgrounds such as strategic alliances/partnerships and relational 
contracts can also provide relevant explanations for the phenomenon of OBC in servitization. Further research 
building upon these theoretical lenses would be welcomed. 
Finally, the typology of key relationships specified in this study can be used as a reference for further 
research to examine the dynamics of firm-customer relationships in complex servitized systems in other 
contexts, refining this way the initial classification here developed and expanding on issues concerning co-
capability coordination and alignment. Further studies could also consider relationships initiatives between 
firms with focus on trust development and analysis of the degree of criticality of each relationship. The 
investment in value-driven relational initiatives can potentially determine co-capability and, ultimately, the 
performance of the service system as a whole. 
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